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This monograph, weighing in a hefty 488 pages including bibliography and index of proper 
names, is a labor of love and a tour de force. Chang Jui-te is perhaps best known as one of the 
foremost military historians of Republican China. Although the key figures that populate this 
monograph were all military men, this is not primarily a work of military history. Chang’s earlier 
monographs focussed on Republican era institutions, particularly railroads, but despite its 
ostensible subject – Chiang Kai-shek’s personal secretariat – this is no mere institutional study. 
Instead, Wusheng de Yaojue goes far beyond Chang’s earlier work, and by sheer force of example 
makes a very strong case for bringing together different kinds of history. Institutional history, 
military history, biographical history, intelligence history, Party history, diplomatic history, and 
the fraught history of modern China in Tibet are all covered. And if one widens notions of 
culture to include the difficult circumstances and perceptual filters under which individuals made 
the kinds of decisions they did, then cultural history is included as well.  
The focus of this monograph is an almost unknown organization, the National Government 
Military Affairs Commission Head’s Personal Secretariat (國民政府軍事委員會委員長侍從
室), or the Personal Secretariat (侍從室) for short. The very name of the organization hints at 
what is to come. As part of the National Government through the Military Affairs Commission 
it had inherent potential for spread throughout government, military and party organizations; as 
an advisory organization to the Head of the Military Affairs Commission, by design it served one 
man and one man only – Chiang Kai-shek. 
The origins of the Personal Secretariat, however, were very different. Chang lays out a vivid 
scene from 1933, when Chiang Kai-shek granted an audience at his Nanchang Headquarters to a 
newly returned student, Zhang Yiding. Zhang, had recently finished his PhD in law at Columbia 
University, and witnessed first-hand what he perceived as the  efficiency and industriousness of 
Western Europe and the chaos, waste and laziness of Africa and the Middle East on his travels 
back to China proposed that Chiang create a “Camp Planning Committee” (行營設計會) in 
order to “improve all provincial party, government, and military organizations – and to restore 
construction work in areas recovered from communist at the earliest opportunity” [P. 11]. 
Chiang Kai-shek agreed readily, and a new unit was established with a brief that included 
advising on every possible organizational and institutional reform to bring greater efficiency and 
coordination to a still weak National Government. Originally staffed by a handful of young, 
idealistic, and often foreign trained recent graduates, the Camp Planning Committee was never 
able to transcend the military organization that housed it. The highly educated initial staff was 
eased out by a small cadre of military men, most of whom were of unimpeachable loyalty to 
Chiang Kai-shek from Whampoa days, and the focus of the new organization, now renamed the 
Personal Secretariat, shifted away from reforming the government and provinces to be more 
modern and efficient, and towards managing paper flows from multiple security, military and 
foreign affairs organizations, advising on general policy directions, and, insofar as it was able to, 
implementing the wishes of Chiang Kai-shek.  
Wusheng de Yaojue contains a wealth of carefully sourced information and balanced analysis. 
Chang’s research on the Personal Secretariat’s activities is nothing short of magisterial. In this 
volume there is something for every scholar of Republican era political or institutional history to 
like. After the first two chapters, which concentrate on antecedents to the Personal Secretariat 
and it organization and key personnel, further lengthy chapters are devoted to such important 
topics as intelligence (Chapter Three), party and government (Chapter Four), the military 
(Chapter Five), diplomacy (Chapter Six), propaganda (Chapter Seven), and relatively shorter 
concluding chapters on a new system of Chiang’s personally handwritten orders (Chapter Eight), 
and  efforts to advance China’s claims on the southwestern border between Tibet and India. 
Most scholars would be satisfied with a monograph on one, or at most two, of these topics, but 
Chang considers each as fully as the sources allow.   
In addition to the sheer span of sub-topics so ably researched, Chang does something that very 
few scholars are able to do with political and administrative history: he makes it interesting and 
enjoyable to read. His sources are astonishingly comprehensive. They draw from private diaries, 
archives from Chongqing to Nanjing to Taibei, memoirs, and a truly incredible range of 
secondary sources in Chinese and English. Many historians are as conscientious, but Chang’s real 
gift is his ability to weave together the macro and the micro in an utterly compelling way. 
Through reflections captured in the diaries of key individuals and subordinates, the reader is 
really given a sense of the Personal Secretariat’s organizational culture of self effacing loyalty  and 
caution, as well as the personalities and struggles endured by its key personalities – particularly 
Chen Bulei, who oversaw the Secretariat and Tang Zong, who was the head of Secretariat’s Sixth 
Section in charge of intelligence. One sees the forms that tabulate the blizzard of paper coming 
in to the  relatively small and undermanned Personal Secretariat  - paper that had to be 
organized, sorted by level of importance, digested, and when necessary, passed on to Chiang 
Kai-shek. Chang builds from the small vignette to the medium level analysis that lays out such 
important topics as the competition between the Guomindang Party Central Executive 
Committee Investigation and Statistics Bureau (中統), dominated by the Chen Brothers  and the 
National Government Military Affairs Committee Investigation and Statistics Bureau (軍統) 
headed by the fearsome Dai Li and Mao Renfeng, (The monograph is more than worth acquiring 
solely for the chapter the details the domestic strife between different intelligence units, and the 
Personal Secretariat’s efforts to coordinate and dampen down those tensions). Also detailed are 
the Personal Secretariat’s mostly vain efforts to reinvigorate and establish control over Party 
organization and its only partial success in asserting control over military appointments. The 
Personal Secretariat was also only partially successful in implementing Chiang Kai-shek’s wishes 
in the realm of diplomacy, which often involved bypassing the regular diplomats in favour of 
direct summits, and worryingly frequently engaging in secret diplomacy and deals about which 
the regular diplomatic establishment had no knowledge. Each chapter is brought to a thoughtful 
conclusion with a general evaluation of what the Secretariat was and was not able to accomplish 
It is at this final level of macro analysis that the monograph’s real substance becomes clear. An 
extended research project that is ostensibly on a little-known advisory organization at the highest 
levels of decision making political and military power in the 1930s and 1940s in microcosm 
reflects the Nationalist Party-military-government’s efforts to quickly form an effective and 
responsive government under enormous resource constraints. The Personal Secretariat quickly 
morphed into a synecdoche for Chiang Kai-shek’s state building efforts as a whole: cautious, 
stressing loyalty above all, and utterly outmatched by the circumstances in which the attempt was 
made to bring bring order, coordination, and reinvigoration to China as a whole. This is a 
volume that is sure to be consulted widely by scholars of Republican China. Chang Jui-de is to 
be congratulated for bringing out such detailed and superb scholarship for us all. 
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